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THE U.S. AND THE ICC: NO MORE EXCUSES 
JORDAN J. PAUST∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
More than fourteen years after its creation and twelve years after it 
began to function, the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) still does not 
have direct support from the United States as a party to its constitutive 
instrument. There had been prior excuses for the U.S. not becoming a 
party to the Rome Statute. For example, it had been claimed that there 
might be unfounded or politicized prosecutions involving unprofessional 
prosecutors and judges and that a new definition of aggression that could 
later be created might prevent the United States from using armed force 
that is permissible under the United Nations Charter. Others had thought 
that by not becoming a party to the treaty, the U.S. could assure that U.S. 
nationals would not be prosecuted before the ICC. Are any of these 
excuses valid today, whether or not they had been previously? 
I. PRIOR EXCUSES 
A. Previously Stated Concerns 
1. Unfounded Prosecutions 
One of the stated reasons for U.S. concern had been that the ICC might 
engage in “unfounded charges” against U.S. officials,1 despite obvious 
limitations of its jurisdiction that are set forth in the Rome Statute of the 
ICC2 with respect to the types of crimes that can be prosecuted before the 
ICC.3 For example, in December 2000 President Clinton expressed this 
concern but added that the U.S. had “worked effectively to develop 
procedures that limit the likelihood of politicized prosecutions,”4 which 
had been an additional and related concern of the United States. Giving an 
example, President Clinton then stated that “U.S. civilian and military 
 
 
 ∗ Mike & Teresa Baker Law Center Professor, University of Houston. 
 1. See, e.g., William Clinton, Statement by the President: Signature of the International 
Criminal Court Treaty (Dec. 31, 2000) [hereinafter Clinton Statement], available at http://clinton4.na 
ra.gov/textonly/library/hot_releases/December_31_2000.html. 
 2. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute of the ICC]. 
 3. See id. arts. 5–8. 
 4. Clinton Statement, supra note 1. 
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negotiators helped to ensure greater precision in the definitions of crimes 
within the Court’s jurisdiction.”5 
With more precise definitions appearing in the Rome Statute of the 
ICC and the subsequent creation of the Elements of Crimes,6 one would 
assume that ICC use of “unfounded” charges had become most unlikely. 
Nonetheless, in subsequent years the Bush Administration also expressed 
concern that ICC jurisdictional provisions left U.S. officials “subject to ‘an 
unaccountable prosecutor’ and ‘unchecked judicial power.’”7 This is 
especially true since the United States had been unsuccessful in limiting 
all prosecutions before the ICC to those authorized by the United Nations 
Security Council and, therefore, a U.S. control available through exercise 
of its veto power.8 Contrary to stated fears of rogue prosecutors, it is 
obvious that prosecutors would be “accountable” before Pre-Trial, Trial, 
and Appellate Chambers of the ICC if they tried to deviate from the 
definitions set forth in the Rome Statute of the ICC or the Elements of 
Crimes.9 With respect to “unchecked judicial power,” it may be noted that 
 
 
 5. Id.; see also M. Cherif Bassiouni, Negotiating the Treaty of Rome on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, 32 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 443, 457 (1999) (stating that “the articles 
dealing with procedure and with the definition of crimes were substantially as the United States 
wanted”). 
 6. See Elements of Crimes, pt. II-B, ICC Doc. No. ICC-ASP/1/3 (Sept. 9, 2002). Concerning 
the creation of the Elements of Crimes, see, for example, Leila Nadya Sadat, Summer in Rome, Spring 
in the Hague, Winter in Washington? U.S. Policy Towards the International Criminal Court, 21 WIS. 
INT’L L.J. 557, 575–76 (2003); David J. Scheffer, Staying the Course with the International Criminal 
Court, 35 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 47, 56, 74–75 (2002). 
 7. Megan A. Fairlie, The United States and the International Criminal Court Post-Bush: A 
Beautiful Courtship but an Unlikely Marriage, 29 BERK. J. INT’L L. 528, 537 (2011) (quoting John R. 
Bolton, Under Sec’y for Arms Control and Int’l Security, Remarks to the Federalist Society: The 
United States and the International Criminal Court (Nov. 14, 2002)); see also Christopher T. Cline, 
Perspectives of a Non-Party to the International Criminal Court Treaty, 17 TRANSNAT’L L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 111 (2008) (complaining of ICC “functioning without accountability to a 
superior body, such as the United Nations Security Council”); Prashant Sabharwal, Manifest Destiny: 
The Relationship Between the United States and the International Criminal Court in a Time of 
International Upheaval, 18 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 311, 319 (2012). 
 8. See, e.g., JORDAN J. PAUST, M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
553 (3d ed. 2007); Fairlie, supra note 7, at 534–35; Sabharwal, supra note 7, at 320; William A. 
Schabas, United States Hostility to the International Criminal Court: It’s All About the Security 
Council, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 701, 709, 712–19 (2004); Johan D. van der Vyver, American 
Exceptionalism: Human Rights, International Criminal Justice, and National Self-Righteousness, 50 
EMORY L.J. 775, 800 (2001). 
 9. See Sadat, supra note 6, at 588 (noting that the Rome “Statute contains extensive safeguards 
designed to limit the Prosecutor’s scope of action, many of which are the direct result of U.S. 
government proposals”); Scheffer, supra note 6, at 76, 81–82 (“Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
regulate the prosecutor’s actions”), 92–93; Stephen Eliot Smith, Definitely Maybe: The Outlook for 
U.S. Relations With the International Criminal Court During the Obama Administration, 22 FLA. J. 
INT’L L. 155, 178 n.152 (2010) (citing Christopher Keith Hall, The Powers and Role of the Prosecutor 
of the International Criminal Court in the Global Fight Against Impunity, 17 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 121, 
125 (2004); Theodor Meron, The Court We Want, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 1998, at A15); Ruth 
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the Supreme Court of the United States is seemingly more unchecked,10 
but no one would seriously argue that its judicial power and independence 
should be subject to political control, the very circumstance associated 
with unacceptable “politicized” prosecutions and institutions.11 
2. Politicized Prosecutions 
Another stated concern of the United States had been the fear that the 
ICC might permit “politicized” prosecutions of U.S. officials,12 but 
President Clinton noted that this was far less likely after efforts to provide 
greater precision with respect to definitions of the crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the ICC had been successful.13 Moreover, as noted above, 
ICC prosecutors are accountable in several ways to an independent 
judiciary that is itself subject to policing for improper judicial conduct and 
politicized prosecutions. For these reasons, prior fears of unfounded 
charges and politicized prosecutions have themselves become unfounded. 
Commentators have also noted that actual practice before the ICC 
during the last ten years should allay any lingering fears of politicized 
prosecutions.14 As U.S. Ambassador Stephen Rapp noted in 2010 with 
 
 
Wedgwood, Harold K. Jacobson & Monroe Leigh, The United States and the Statute of Rome, 95 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 124, 128–29 (2001) (the Prosecutor “will have no independent power to issue legal process 
or to open an investigation. Instead, he must secure the agreement of the three-member pretrial 
chamber before he can even begin an investigation or issue legal process. Moreover, when he applies 
to the pretrial chamber for authorization, he must notify all other parties to the statute and all states that 
‘would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crimes concerned.’ This latter phase includes both the 
territorial state and the state of nationality of the accused.”). 
 10. U.S. Supreme Court Justices are not elected, might someday be impeached, but otherwise 
serve for life or until resignation. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. Judges of the 
ICC are elected by the Assembly of States Parties for a term of years, see Rome Statute of the ICC, 
supra note 2, arts. 36(6)(a), (9)(b), are subject to rules concerning their required judicial independence, 
see id. art. 40, can be excused from a case or disqualified as a judge, see id. art. 41, and can be 
removed from office, see id. art. 46. 
 11. See van der Vyver, supra note 8, at 799–800 (rightly noting “[t]he paradox of submitting, on 
the one hand, that the ICC will inevitably (or may) become politicized or might not act impartially, and 
on the other hand, proposing that a Security Council veto of ICC actions is an appropriate remedy”) 
(citations omitted). 
 12. See, e.g., Clinton Statement, supra note 1; Cline, supra note 7, at 113; Fairlie, supra note 7, 
at 533, 536–37 n.48, 550 n.129, 559; Marcella David, Grotius Repudiated: The American Objections 
to the International Criminal Court and the Commitment to International Law, 20 MICH. J. INT’L L. 
337, 357 (1999); John Washburn, The International Criminal Court Arrives—The U.S. Position: 
Status and Prospects, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 873, 876–77 (2002) (also noting a number of safeguards 
built into the Rome Statute). 
 13. See Clinton Statement, supra note 1. 
 14. See, e.g., Fairlie, supra note 7, at 548 n.119, 549 (noting what should be “the positive 
perception . . . that the ICC judiciary stands ready to ensure a fair trial”), 559, 573; Sabharwal, supra 
note 7, at 325–26 (noting that “the Prosecutor has demonstrated a rather cautious and measured 
approach toward opening investigations,” only one out of seven then current cases was initiated by the 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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respect to a prior U.S. concern about politicized prosecutions, “[t]hus far, 
the Court has been appropriately focused.”15 There is no reason why the 
Court will not continue to focus on the crimes and procedures set forth in 
the Rome Statute that necessarily limit its jurisdiction and proceedings. 
3. The Crime of Aggression 
One stated worry of the United States was whether the crime of 
aggression that would be prosecutable before the ICC might limit 
permissible use of armed force under the United Nations Charter.16 This 
might have been possible if the definition of aggression encompassed the 
use of armed force that is not prohibited under Article 2, paragraph 4 of 
the U.N. Charter17 or that is permissible as Security Council authorized 
enforcement action under Article 42,18 individual or collective self-defense 
under Article 51,19 or regional action under Article 5220 of the U.N. 
Charter. Because there has not always been agreement concerning what 
constitutes an act of aggression,21 there was a danger that a new definition 
of the crime of aggression for ICC prosecution might deviate from the law 
of the Charter. 
 
 
Prosecutor, “he also refrained from charging excessively expansive counts,” and “judges and staff 
have displayed exceptional professionalism”); Smith, supra note 9, at 178–80 (demonstrating why 
politicized prosecution is now “even more improbable”); see also Judge Richard Goldstone, The 
Future of International Criminal Justice: The Crucial Role of the United States, 18 ILSA J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 615, 623 (2012) (explaining that “a professional office such as the Office of the Prosecutor 
would not be able to get away with . . . [unprofessional] bias”). 
 15. See Ambassador Stephen J. Rapp, Ambassador-at-Large, Office of Global Criminal Justice, 
U.S. Dep’t of State, comments, U.S. Dep’t of State, Special Briefing: U.S. Engagement with the 
International Criminal Court and the Outcome of the Recently Concluded Review Conference (June 
15, 2010), available at http://geneva.usmission.gov/2010/06/15/u-s-engagement-with-the-icc/. 
 16. See, e.g., David, supra note 12, at 355, 359–61; Fairlie, supra note 7, at 551–53; Harold 
Hongju Koh, U.S. Dep’t of State Legal Advisor, The U.S. and the International Criminal Court: Report 
From the Kampala Review Conference, at 4 (June 16, 2010) [hereinafter ASIL discussion] (one of the 
U.S. objectives at Kampala was the ensure that “those lawful uses of force remain acts that we are able 
to do, particularly in situations such as humanitarian intervention”), available at http://www.asil.org/ 
files/Transcript_ICC_Koh_Rapp_Bellinger.pdf. 
 17. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4; Jordan J. Paust, Use of Armed Force Against Terrorists in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond, 35 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 533, 536–37 (2002). 
 18. See U.N. Charter art. 42; Paust, supra note 17, at 544–45; Jordan J. Paust, Constitutionality 
of U.S. Participation in the United Nations-Authorized War in Libya, 26 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 43, 43–
45 (2012). 
 19. See U.N. Charter art. 51; Paust, supra note 17, at 533–44; Jordan J. Paust, Self-Defense 
Targetings of Non-State Actors and Permissibility of U.S. Use of Drones in Pakistan, 19 J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 237, 238–52 (2010); Jordan J. Paust, Permissible Self-Defense Targeting and 
the Death of bin Laden, 39 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 569, 569–72 (2011). 
 20. See U.N. Charter art. 52; Paust, supra note 17, at 545–47. 
 21. See, e.g., PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra note 8, at 604, 612–13. 
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This danger of deviation is no longer present. First, the definition of the 
crime of aggression adopted during the Review Conference in Kampala in 
June 2010 is unavoidably tied to a requirement that “an act of aggression” 
constitute a “violation of the Charter of the United Nations.”22 Second, the 
act must be a “manifest” violation of the Charter,23 thereby leaving aside 
conduct that is not in obvious violation. Third, the act must be manifestly 
in violation because of “its character, gravity and scale.”24 Within the 
definitional amendment to the Rome Statute, there is also an express 
reference to the 1974 Resolution on the Definition of Aggression.25 The 
1974 Definition expressly affirmed in its preamble “that nothing in this 
Definition shall be interpreted as in any way affecting the scope of the 
provisions of the Charter with respect to the functions and powers of the 
organs of the United Nations,” and declared in Article 2 that “[t]he first 
use of armed force by a State in contravention of the Charter shall 
 
 
 22. Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 2, art. 8 bis, para 1 (“‘crime of aggression’ means the 
planning, initiation or execution . . . of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, 
constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations”); see Surendran Koran, The 
International Criminal Court and Crimes of Aggression Beyond the Kampala Convention, 34 HOUS. J. 
INT’L L. 231, 253 (2012). 
 23. Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 2, art. 8 bis, para. 1; see Koran, supra note 22, at 253; 
Claus Kress & Leonie von Holtzendorff, The Kampala Compromise on the Crime of Aggression, 8 J. 
INT’L CRIM. JUSTICE 1179, 1193 (language that finally appears in art. 8 bis, para. 1 limits the reach of 
U.N. G.A. Res. 3314), 1200 (“the objective requirement of manifest illegality . . . has the effect of 
excluding from the state conduct element any use of armed force that falls into the ‘grey area’ of the 
prohibition of the use of force”), 1211 (“ the requirement of ‘manifest illegality’ takes due regard of 
the fact that regrettably, the primary norm of the prohibition of the use of force suffers from 
considerable ambiguity”); Beth Van Schaack, Negotiating at the Interface of Power and Law: The 
Crime of Aggression, 49 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 506, 522–23 (2011). 
 24. Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 2, art. 8 bis, para. 1; id. Annex III, para. 7 (“It is 
understood that in establishing whether an act of aggression constitutes a manifest violation of the 
Charter . . . the three components of character, gravity and scale must be sufficient to justify a 
‘manifest’ determination. No one component can be significant enough to satisfy the manifest standard 
by itself”); see also Kress & von Holtzendorff, supra note 23, at 1193 (“the criterion of ‘character’ 
(mainly) refers to the problem of the ‘grey area’”), 1206 (the U.S. submitted the “no one component” 
sentence quoted above), 1207 (“the first sentence of the Understanding makes it plain that the Court 
must always look at all three components, although they need not all be present to the same degree,” 
and, regarding the “character” criterion, “[j]udges will thus always have to ascertain that the state use 
of armed force is of a character that makes its illegality reasonably uncontroversial”); Stephen J. Rapp, 
ASIL discussion, supra note 16, at 9 (“We, in terms of character, gravity, and scale, said . . . it had to 
be a combination of them, and then, significantly, that it had to be the most serious and dangerous 
form of the illegal use of force”); Koran, supra note 22, at 253–54. Of course, the ICC must address 
more generally whether a case is “of sufficient gravity.” Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 2, art. 
17(1)(d); see also Margaret M. deGuzman, Gravity and the Legitimacy of the International Criminal 
Court, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1400, 1400 (2009). 
 25. Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 2, art. 8 bis, para. 2; G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR, 
29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, U.N. Doc. A/9631, at 142 (Dec. 14, 1974) [hereinafter 1974 Definition] 
(referring to Resolution on the Definition of Aggression). 
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constitute prima facie evidence of aggression,”26 thereby limiting 
aggression to armed force “in contravention” of the Charter. It also 
declared in Article 3 that the list of acts set forth therein might qualify as 
acts of aggression “subject to and in accordance with the provisions of 
Article 2,”27 thereby affirming the limitation in Article 2 to use of armed 
force “in contravention” of the Charter.28 
Additionally, a state like the United States can become a party to the 
Rome Statute and opt out of the ICC’s jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression.29 For this reason, among others, Legal Adviser Harold Koh 
declared that the Amendments to the Rome Statute adopted at Kampala 
“ensure total protection for U.S. armed forces and other nationals going 
forward.”30 In view of the fact that crimes of aggression before the ICC 
must be manifest violations of the Charter and that the U.S. can opt out of 
ICC coverage of alleged acts of aggression by the United States, there is 
no longer a valid reason for the U.S. to refuse to become a party to the 
treaty. Certainly the U.S. should no longer worry that the crime of 
aggression will inhibit use of armed force by the United States that is 
permissible under the United Nations Charter.  
 
 
 26. 1974 Definition, supra note 24, art. 2. Similarly, the 1970 Declaration on Principles of 
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among States in Accordance with 
the Charter of the United Nations, having recognized that “[a] war of aggression constitutes a crime 
against the peace” and articulating certain state duties with respect to use of force, declared that 
“[n]othing in the foregoing . . . shall be construed as enlarging or diminishing in any way the scope of 
the provisions of the Charter concerning cases in which the use of force is lawful.” G.A. Res. 2625, 25 
U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8028, at 121 (Oct. 24, 1970). 
 27. 1974 Definition, supra note 24, art. 3; see also Koran, supra note 22, at 253. 
 28. See 1974 Definition, supra note 24, art. 6 (“Nothing in this Definition shall be construed as in 
any way enlarging or diminishing the scope of the Charter, including its provisions concerning cases in 
which the use of force is lawful.”). 
 29. Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 2, art. 15 bis, para. 4 (the ICC cannot “exercise 
jurisdiction over a crime of aggression committed by a State Party . . . if that State Party has previously 
declared that it does not accept such jurisdiction by lodging a declaration with the Registrar”); Fairlie, 
supra note 7, at 557; Koh, supra note 16, at 5; cf. Van Schaack, supra note 23, at 584–89 (addressing 
issues concerning interpretation and future application of the opt out provision). 
 30. Koh, supra note 16, at 5. With respect to the role of the U.N. Security Council, Koh added:  
One channel goes through an exclusive Security Council trigger, which the U.S. has been 
urging. The second goes through a prior Security Council review with three conditions. If the 
Security Council doesn’t make a determination that aggression occurs, the prosecutor has to 
offer a reasonable basis for proceeding. That decision would require a majority vote of six 
judges, and the Security Council would still have the authority to stop the prosecution with a 
red light, Chapter 7 resolution.  
Id. 
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B. The Seeming Real Preference of Some Within the United States 
Although some have expressed concern about unfounded or politicized 
prosecutions of U.S. nationals and whether or not the definition of the 
crime of aggression that will be prosecutable before the ICC will deviate 
from what are permissible uses of force under the United Nations Charter, 
I suspect that for some, the real reason for early opposition to U.S. 
ratification of the Rome Statute was a preference for a functional 
immunity of U.S. nationals from prosecution. This preference is 
sometimes hidden in an effort to achieve a primacy for national 
jurisdiction over that of the ICC in a context when U.S. prosecutions had 
been notably absent with respect to crimes against humanity and, at best, 
quite rare with respect to war crimes.31 Writing in January 2001, Ruth 
Wedgwood, Harold Jacobson, and Monroe Leigh noted that “[t]he 
principal objection raised by the [Clinton] administration . . . was that 
American nationals . . . could in certain contingencies be subjected to trial 
in the new court without the specific consent of the United States.”32 As 
they pointed out: 
From the point of view of our European allies, it is bad enough that 
the exemption [of non-party state nationals proposed by the U.S.] 
has sometimes come as a rather strident demand for American 
exceptionalism, which reinforces their innate suspicion that the 
United States is giving way to hegemonic ambitions. They find it 
the more objectionable because it virtually guarantees that the court 
would be unable to exercise jurisdiction over nationals of rogue 
states who, through lack of caution or otherwise, happen to come 
into the custody of the court and are unlikely in any event to belong 
to a state that is party to the Rome Statute.33 
In 1999, U.S. legislation contained a section that had been created in an 
attempt to assure that there would be no extradition or transfer of a U.S. 
citizen from any foreign country to the ICC.34 Over several years, the U.S. 
 
 
 31. See Fairlie, supra note 7, at 572 n.256 (also noting a declared U.S. preference for “national” 
prosecutions); Scheffer, supra note 6, at 64–65. 
 32. Wedgwood, Jacobson & Leigh, supra note 9, at 126. 
 33. Id. at 126. Wedgwood, Jacobson & Leigh add that a “main purpose . . . [of the ICC 
jurisdictional provisions is] to deprive war criminals of the impunity they have heretofore enjoyed by 
virtue of the protection of their states of nationality.” Id. at 127. 
 34. See Prohibition on Extradition or Transfer of United States Citizens to the International 
Criminal Court, Pub. L. No. 106-113, Div. B, § 1000(a)(7), 113 Stat. 1536(a)–(b) (1999); PAUST, 
BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra note 8, at 556–57. 
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Executive also entered into a large number of “Article 98” bilateral 
agreements with foreign countries in an effort to exempt U.S. persons 
from transfer to the ICC and had used economic sanctions against 
countries that refused to enter into such agreements.35 Curiously, by 
following the strictures of such a mixture of legislation and Article 98 
agreements, and thereby seeking to deny the possibility of ICC 
prosecution, U.S. nationals who are reasonably accused of having 
participated in certain international crimes could be left in the courts or 
military commissions of foreign countries that exercise territorial or 
universal jurisdiction36 and do not provide important due process 
safeguards that must be complied with during prosecution before the ICC. 
Foreclosing an ICC option would not be in the best interests of U.S. 
nationals or the United States. As I have written previously, 
The United States may wish to strengthen the primacy of ICC 
jurisdiction so that a U.S. national can at least be transferred to the 
ICC and enjoy a panoply of due process guarantees in a neutral 
forum. Adherence to the Rome treaty could provide greater options 
for protection of U.S. nationals than nonadherence. It could also 
provide the United States flexibility with respect to prosecution or 
extradition of foreign nationals accused of international crimes 
committed outside the United States.37 
Wedgwood, Jacobson, and Leigh had noted similarly that it would be 
preferable for a state to have the option of transferring an accused to the 
ICC 
where he might receive a fairer trial than in the courts of the country 
where the offense was committed. Indeed, that is clearly one of the 
principal advantages to be derived from becoming a party to the 
international criminal court. After all, the proposed court would be 
 
 
 35. See, e.g., PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra note 8, at 557; Leila Nadya Sadat, An American 
Vision for Global Justice: Taking the Rule of (International) Law Seriously, 4 WASH. U. GLOBAL 
STUD. L. REV. 329, 336–37 (2005); Cline, supra note 7, at 117–18; Fairlie, supra note 7, at 538; 
Sabharwal, supra note 7, at 321; Sadat, supra note 6, at 558–60. 
 36. Professor van der Vyver has rightly noted that, despite the existence of the ICC and whether 
or not the U.S. becomes a party, all states retain a competence to prosecute crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the ICC under the customary principle of universal jurisdiction. See van der Vyver, 
supra note 8, at 811–16. Regarding universal jurisdiction, see for example, PAUST, BASSIOUNI ET AL., 
supra note 8, at 155–211. This competence is also implicitly recognized in the preamble to the Rome 
Statute, which affirms the concomitant “duty of every state to exercise its jurisdiction over those 
responsible for international crimes.” Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 2, pmbl. 
 37. Jordan J. Paust, The Reach of ICC Jurisdiction Over Non-Signatory Nationals, 33 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 15 (2000). 
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obliged to respect the due-process protections that, largely at 
American insistence, were written into the Statute of Rome and that 
will be reinforced by the Rule of Evidence and Procedure, which 
will apply to the ICC’s proceedings. With few exceptions, 
international, treaty-bound due-process protections are likely to be 
more extensive in an ICC trial. . . .38 
Today, if a U.S. pilot is captured in Iran and is accused of having 
committed war crimes in Afghanistan (a party to the Rome Statute39), 
would it be useful for both Iran and the U.S. to agree to Iran’s rendering of 
the pilot to the ICC for investigation by the ICC Prosecutor? 
During the Bush-Cheney era, outright hostility to ICC jurisdiction 
became the policy. For example, Under Secretary John Bolton announced 
that “[w]e will take the actions necessary to ensure that our efforts . . . to 
protect Americans [and that “our global security commitments”] . . . are 
not impaired by the potential for investigations, inquiry, or prosecution by 
the International Criminal Court, whose jurisdiction [allegedly] does not 
extend to Americans.”40 As Professor Leila Sadat noted in 2003, the Bush 
Administration made significant efforts to assure that U.S. nationals 
enjoyed “impunity from the ICC.”41 Perhaps of great concern to those 
reasonably accused of participation in international crimes was the 
statement of ICC Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo in March 2007 that George 
W. Bush and others might face war crimes investigations with respect to 
unlawful conduct of coalition forces in Iraq.42 
 
 
 38. Wedgwood, Jacobson & Leigh, supra note 9, at 127. 
 39. Since Afghanistan is a party, one of the alternative circumstances set forth in Article 12 
would be satisfied if alleged crimes took place at least partly within Afghanistan. See Rome Statute of 
the ICC, supra note 2, art. 12(2)(a). Since Iran is not a party, Iran technically cannot refer a situation to 
the ICC under Article 14(1), but the Prosecutor could proceed under Articles 13(c) and 15. See id. arts. 
12–15. 
 40. Fairlie, supra note 7, at 537 n.58 (quoting John R. Bolton, Under Sec’y for Arms Control and 
Int’l Sec., Remarks to the Am. Enter. Inst.: American Justice and the Int’l Crim. Ct. (Nov. 3. 2003)); 
see also Cline, supra note 7, at 112 (claiming that ICC jurisdiction over U.S. nationals “threatens the 
sovereignty of the United States”); Smith, supra note 9, at 167; van der Vyver, supra note 8, at 804 (a 
main purpose of the U.S. had been to seek a “dispensation” of international criminal law for U.S. 
citizens); Washburn, supra note 12, at 878–79 (addressing U.S. demands for total exemption of U.S. 
nationals from prosecution). 
 41. Sadat, supra note 6, at 558; see also id. at 557 n.3 (quoting Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld), 
584–86 (regarding fear of jurisdiction over U.S. nationals that can obtain without U.S. “consent”), 593 
n.131 (providing apt recognition that this type of opposition may have been tied to a realization that 
conduct of various U.S. nationals during the Bush-Cheney era could be prosecuted as war crimes). 
 42. See, e.g., Alexis Unkovic, ICC Prosecutor Says Bush, Blair Could Face War Crimes 
Investigation, JURIST (Mar. 19, 2007), http://jurist.org/paperchase/2007/03/icc-prosecutor-says-bush-
blair-could.php. 
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Fear of prosecution before the ICC was not the Bush Administration’s 
only worry. There were also efforts to prosecute former members of the 
administration in Germany, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland that were mostly 
unsuccessful due to significant political pressure from the U.S. 
Executive.43 Quite clearly, the U.S. Executive was not merely seeking 
impunity for U.S. nationals before the ICC, but also impunity before 
national courts. Subsequently, the Obama Administration generally 
abandoned the rule of law by refusing to faithfully execute the law and 
engage in good faith prosecution of various members of the Bush-Cheney 
era who are reasonably accused of having international criminal 
responsibility arising out of their participation in President Bush’s 
admitted “program” of secret detention (or forced disappearance) and 
coercive interrogation.44 The failure of the Obama Administration to 
initiate prosecution of those who are reasonably accused has resulted in a 
situation where, because there had been and will be no national U.S. 
efforts to prosecute, potential ICC jurisdiction over some of the accused is 
even stronger. 
II. ADDITIONAL CONTEXTUAL REALITIES 
A. Changes Regarding the Article 12 Circumstance 
Today, there are 121 parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC.45 One of 
the circumstances listed in Article 12 of the Rome Statute that can allow 
the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC over nationals of non-parties to the 
treaty is met if “[t]he State on the territory of which the conduct in 
question occurred” is a party to the treaty.46 Afghanistan is a party. If 
conduct relevant to a crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC has allegedly 
been committed by a U.S. national in Afghanistan, therefore, any party to 
the treaty who gains custody of the U.S. national can refer the matter to 
the Prosecutor under Articles 13, paragraph a, and 14, paragraph 1 of the 
treaty, or the Prosecutor can initiate an investigation under Articles 13, 
 
 
 43. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Genocide in Rwanda, State Responsibility to Prosecute or 
Extradite, and Nonimmunity for Heads of State and Other Public Officials, 34 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 57, 
80–82, 81–82 n.102 (2011). 
 44. See generally Jordan J. Paust, Ending the U.S. Program of Torture and Impunity: President 
Obama’s First Steps and the Path Forward, 19 TULANE J. INT’L & COMP. L. 151, 160–62 (2010); 
Paust, supra note 43, at 81 n.102, 84–85; see also infra notes 55–56. 
 45. See The States Parties to the Rome Statute, ICC, http://www2.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ASP/states+ 
parties/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2013). 
 46. See Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 2, art. 12(2)(a). 
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paragraph c, and 15 of the treaty.47 Because there are 121 parties to the 
treaty who might gain custody of a U.S. national accused, the chances of 
this circumstance occurring with respect to alleged criminal conduct in 
Afghanistan have increased over the years whether or not the U.S. 
becomes a party. Additionally, the chances of a U.S. national being 
reasonably accused of having committed an international crime in the 
future within the territory of any other party to the treaty have increased 
markedly. Because the circumstance listed in Article 12(2)(a) of the treaty 
can be met in some cases and because there is no immunity from ICC 
jurisdiction merely because the United States has not ratified the treaty,48 a 
desire to protect U.S. nationals from prosecution before the ICC is not a 
valid or viable reason for not becoming a party to the treaty. 
B. The Reality Regarding Complimentarity 
Under Article 17 of the Rome Statute, “a case is inadmissible where,” 
for example, 
(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which 
has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable 
genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution; [or] 
(b) The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction 
over it and the State has decided not to prosecute the person 
concerned, unless the decision resulted from the unwillingness or 
inability of the State genuinely to prosecute.49  
Text writers have generalized that in view of Article 17 and the principle 
of complimentarity, which involves deference in certain specific instances 
to viable and genuine national jurisdiction, the ICC should accept cases 
“only where national authorities are unwilling or unable [genuinely] to 
handle them.”50 However, the ICC was created with a determination “to 
put an end to impunity for the perpetrators” of “the most serious crimes of 
 
 
 47. See generally Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
93 AM. J. INT’L L. 22, 26 (1999); Paust, supra note 36, at 1–3, 5–7; see also supra note 32. 
 48. See supra note 47. 
 49. Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 2, art. 17(1)(a)–(b) (emphasis added). 
 50. Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Nationalizing International Criminal Law, 41 STANFORD J. INT’L L. 
1, 6 (2005); see also M. Cherif Bassiouni, Perspectives on International Criminal Justice, 50 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 269, 287 (2010); William W. Burke-White, Proactive Complimentarity: The International 
Criminal Court and National Courts in the Rome System of International Justice, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 
53, 64–65, 77–79, 87–88 (2008); Philippe Kirsh, Applying the Principles of Nuremberg in the 
International Criminal Court, 6 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 501, 505 (2007); Fairlie, supra note 
7, at 560–63. 
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concern to the international community” and to assure that such crimes 
“must not go unpunished,” but because “their effective prosecution must 
be ensured,”51 national courts would recognizably play an important role 
in prosecuting the most serious crimes of concern to the community in 
view of the unavoidable customary “duty of every State to exercise its 
criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes.”52 
Deference to national prosecutions of such crimes is clearly not the only 
policy at stake, and it is not the primary purpose of the Rome Statute, 
which is to create a permanent International Criminal Court. Furthermore, 
the specific provisions of Article 17 necessarily limit complimentarity.53 
In any event, Article 17 of the Rome Statute cannot preclude 
admissibility of cases involving alleged criminal conduct of various 
members of the former Bush Administration who authorized and/or 
abetted crimes that took place at least partly in Afghanistan. Article 17 is 
no obstacle because (1) those reasonably accused have not been 
prosecuted and, as explained below, the United States is “unable genuinely 
to carry out the investigation or prosecution”54 of alleged crimes against 
 
 
 51. Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 2, pmbl. 
 52. Id. This duty has been recognized especially in modern international criminal law treaties and 
has long been part of customary international law expressed, for example, as the duty aut dedere aut 
judicare (i.e., to either hand over or initiate prosecution). See, e.g., PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra 
note 8, at 10 (noting that the duty “aut dedere . . . aut punire” was addressed by Hugo Grotius in 
1624), 12, 17–19, 27, 131–32, 134–35, 138–41, 143–44, 155, 169, 452; Paust, supra note 43, at 63–69. 
In the 1700s, Blackstone had early recognized that “where the individuals of any state violate” the law 
of nations, “it is then . . . the duty of the government under which they live to animadvert upon them 
with a becoming severity” and, if individuals are not punished, the state becomes an “accomplice or 
abettor.” 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 68 (1765); see also 
United States v. Klintock, 18 U.S. 144, 147–48 (1820) (piracy “is an offense against all. It is 
punishable in the Courts of all . . . [and our courts] are authorized and bound to punish”); Ex parte dos 
Santos, 17 F. Cas. 949, 953 (C.C.D. Va. 1835) (quoting Emerich de Vattel: “‘duty to punish or 
surrender’”); Henfield’s Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1103 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (Jay, C.J.) (ought also to 
prosecute and punish them for an international crime); id. at 1108 (Wilson, J.) (alternative duty to 
punish an international crime); Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. 111, 117 (1784) (“it is now the 
interest as well as the duty of every government to punish with becoming severity all the individuals 
. . . who commit this offence” against the law of nations); Territorial Rights-Florida, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 
68, 69 (1797) (“it is the interest as well as the duty of every government to punish” customary 
international crimes). 
 53. But see Michael A. Newton, The Complimentarity Conundrum: Are We Watching Evolution 
or Evisceration?, 8 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 115, 120 (claiming that complimentarity should not 
merely override a limited deference but also “prioritizes the authority of domestic forums to prosecute 
the crimes defined in Article 5”), 133 (“to preserve the primacy of domestic jurisdictions”), 137 
(claiming rather remarkably that “the clear preference of the ICC is to maintain the sovereign authority 
of states”) (2010). 
 54. See Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 2, art. 17(1)(a). The definite article “the” instead of 
the indefinite “an” in the phrase “the investigation or prosecution” (emphasis added) emphasizes that 
reference is made to the same case that is before the ICC, and so does use of the definitive article “the” 
in the phrase “the case” in Article 17(1)(a) and (b). Id. art. 17(1)(a)–(b) (emphasis added). “The case” 
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humanity within the jurisdiction of the ICC, such as the secret detention or 
forced disappearance of persons,55 and (2) the Obama Administration is 
 
 
is necessarily the same case that is before the ICC, which would also be “the case” or crime identified 
as such in Articles 6–8. See id. art. 18(1) (the Prosecutor will notify States that “would normally 
exercise jurisdiction over the crimes concerned”) (emphasis added); Linda A. Keller, The Practice of 
the International Criminal Court: Comments on the Complimentarity Conundrum, 8 SANTA CLARA J. 
INT’L L. 199, 207–08 (“practice of the ICC . . . may support the concern that the state must investigate 
or prosecute crimes that match ICC provisions . . . that the state action relate to the precise charges 
brought before the ICC” and “the state must also be focused on the same predicate act . . . or same 
factual basis”), 209 (“the ‘case’ . . . has been interpreted to mean a specific incident such that the state 
proceedings must encompass [at least] the same person and conduct”) (2010); Newton, supra note 53, 
at 146–48. Newton states:  
It is essential for states to criminalize the conduct that makes up the crimes listed in Article 5. 
[I]n order to preserve the right to investigate and prosecute these crimes, it is essential that 
states adequately implement the ICC crimes. . . . [T]he lack of statutory authority that 
parallels ICC crimes has led to recent warnings that legislative amendments are needed . . . 
[and] without acceptable implementation of the substantive ICC crimes, the Prosecutor or 
Pre-Trial Chamber may have no other alternative but to find that a state is ‘unable genuinely’ 
to investigate or prosecute, since the state’s legal system will not allow such a 
prosecution. . . . For example, where a national has committed genocide but the domestic 
forum has not criminalize genocide, the state may either refrain from prosecution, or may 
choose to prosecute the person for murder or another inferior crime. In either situation, the 
ICC Prosecutor may arguably be permitted to step in an prosecute that state’s national due to 
the inability of the state to prosecute the full conduct under its criminal system. 
Id.; Xavier Philippe, The Principles of Universal Jurisdiction and Complimentarity: How Do the Two 
Principles Intermesh?, 88 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 375, 390 (2006) (“[an obvious requirement is that] 
the definition of international crimes in domestic legislation . . . be in line with their definition at the 
international level”); Dawn Sedman, Should the Prosecution of Ordinary Crimes in Domestic 
Jurisdictions Satisfy the Complimentarity Principle?, in FUTURE PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 259, 266 (Carsten Stahn & Larissa van den Herik eds., 2010) (“complimentarity is 
not satisfied” if a state is “prosecuting for an ordinary crime”); see also supra note 51; infra notes 61, 
67. But see generally Kevin Jon Heller, A Sentence-Based Theory of Complimentarity, 53 HARV. INT’L 
L.J. 85 (2012) (arguing for a relaxation of “the hard mirror” approach to complimentarity, that results 
in denial if domestic prosecution is for an “ordinary” crime, in favor of a same or greater sentence 
approach). 
 Importantly, Article 17(1)(c) is quite different because it addresses a special circumstance where 
an accused “has already been tried for conduct which is the subject of the complaint, and a trial is not 
permitted under Article 20, paragraph 3.” Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 2, art 17(1)(c) 
(emphasis added). The focus on “conduct” in such a circumstance might allow the ICC to declare that 
a complaint is inadmissible where the accused has already been tried for an “ordinary” domestic crime 
covering the “same conduct” if the domestic trial was not “for the purpose of shielding the person 
concerned from criminal responsibility” or otherwise runs afoul of Article 20, paragraph 3(b). See id. 
arts. 17(1)(c), 20(3)(a)–(b); Linda A. Carter, The Principle of Complimentarity and the International 
Criminal Court: The Role of Ne Bis in Idem, 8 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 165, 167–68, 176–80 n.40, 
nn.44–47, 185 (2010) (“same facts” but “different crimes” should not preclude ICC prosecution) 
(citing WARD N. FERDINANDUSSE, DIRECT APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW IN 
NATIONAL COURTS 205 (2006); WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT 192–93 (3d ed. 2007)); see also Heller, supra, at 89, 91 (focusing on Articles 
17(1)(c) and 20(3)). But see Sharon A. Williams & William A. Schabas, Article 17 Issues of 
Admissibility, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: 
OBSERVERS’ NOTES 605, 617 (Otto Triffterer ed., 2d ed. 2008) (same conduct approach may not serve 
goals of complimentarity process). 
 55. Concerning the crime of secret detention or forced disappearance, see, for example, Rome 
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either unwilling or genuinely unable to carry out an investigation or 
prosecution of war crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC.56 With 
respect to alleged war crime responsibility, (1) no such case is currently 
“being investigated or prosecuted” within the meaning of Article 17(1)(a), 
and (2) only rare cases have “been investigated” within the meaning of 
Article 17(1)(b).57 Further, the shameful decision of the Obama 
Administration to end criminal investigations may have “resulted from the 
unwillingness or inability”58 of the U.S. “genuinely to prosecute” within 
the meaning of the same provision of the treaty. In any event, with respect 
to the vast majority of former members of the Bush Administration who 
are reasonably accused, there is obvious inaction and, as the Appeals 
Chamber of the ICC has ruled, “inaction on the part of a State having 
jurisdiction (that is, the fact that a State is not investigating or prosecuting, 
or has not done so) renders a case admissible before the Court.”59 In each 
 
 
Statute of the ICC, supra note 2, art. 7(1)(i), (2)(i); JORDAN J. PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW—THE BUSH 
ADMINISTRATION’S UNLAWFUL RESPONSES IN THE “WAR” ON TERROR 34–41, 193–97 (2007); M. 
Cherif Bassiouni, The Institutionalization of Torture Under the Bush Administration, 37 CASE W. RES. 
J. INT’L L. 389, 411–13 (2006); Paust, supra note 43, at 80–81 n.102; Leila Nadya Sadat, 
Extraordinary Rendition, Torture, and Other Nightmares from the War on Terror, 75 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1200, 1200, 1205, 1209, 1212, 1215, 1222, 1224, 1229, 1236–38 (2007); Leila Nadya Sadat, 
Ghost Prisoners and Black Sites: Extraordinary Rendition Under International Law, 57 CASE W. RES. 
J. INT’L L. 309, 309–10, 313, 315–16, 326, 336, 338 (2006); Diane Marie Amann, The Committee 
Against Torture Urges an End to Guantanamo Detention, ASIL INSIGHTS (June 8, 2006), 
http://www.asil.org/insights/2006/06/insights060608.html. 
 56. With respect to alleged war crime responsibilities, see, e.g., THE UNITED STATES AND 
TORTURE: INTERROGATION, INCARCERATION, AND ABUSE 2–3, 9, 13, 15, 43, 147–48, 179, 246, 249–
50, 263, 281–83, 287, 293–99, 311, 315, 317 (Marjorie Cohn ed. 2011); M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE 
INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF TORTURE BY THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION (2010); PAUST, supra note 55, at 
1, 12–20, 26–30; Diane Marie Amann, Abu Ghraib, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2085, 2086, 2094 (2005); 
Bassiouni, supra note 55, at 411–13; Jordan J. Paust, The Absolute Prohibition of Torture and 
Necessary and Appropriate Sanctions, 43 VAL. U.L. REV. 1535, 1544–45, 1554–57, 1559–69 (2009); 
Paust, supra note 43, at 151–52 n.1 (listing writings of additional textwriters, including those of Jóse 
E. Alvarez, M. Cherif Bassiouni, Christopher L. Blakesley, Marjorie Cohn, Benjamin G. Davis, David 
E. Graham, Aya Gruber, Scott Horton, Peter Margulies, Jamie Mayerfield, Jennifer Moore, Ved P. 
Nanda, Mary Ellen O’Connell, Jens David Ohlin, Leila Nadya Sadat, Philippe Sands, David Scheffer, 
Evan Wallach, David Weissbrodt & Amy Bergquist, and W. Bradley Wendel); Paust, supra note 43, at 
80–81 n.102; Michael P. Scharf, Symposium, Keynote Address: The T-Team, 19 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 
129, 130–31, 134–35 (2010). 
 57. See Paust, supra note 43, at 84–85; Paust, supra note 44, at 161. 
 58. See Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 2, art. 17(2)–(3) (concerning unwillingness or 
inability). 
 59. Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga & Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07 OA 8, 
Judgment, ¶ 78 (Sept. 25, 2009). The Appeals Chamber also noted that one of the objects and purposes 
of the Rome Statute, to put an end to impunity, must be considered when interpreting the treaty. Id. 
¶ 79; see also Thomas Obel Hansen, A Critical Review of the ICC’s Recent Practice Concerning 
Admissibility Challenges and Complimentarity, 13 MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 217, 220–21 nn.8–12 
(2012) (“Markus Benzing . . . argues that the ‘[m]ere inaction of a state in the face of crimes having 
been or being committed thus leads to admissibility. . . .’ This interpretation, which appears widely 
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such circumstance, the cases remain admissible before the ICC and the 
principle of complimentarity set forth in Article 17 does not stand in the 
way of ICC investigation and prosecution of former members of the Bush 
Administration who are reasonably accused of having authorized, abetted, 
or perpetrated relevant crimes against humanity and war crimes.60 
With respect to two core crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC, 
genocide and other crimes against humanity, it is evident that the United 
States is basically unable to prosecute them. The United States has no 
federal statute authorizing the prosecution of crimes against humanity as 
such, and the present statute regarding genocide is one that nearly 
guarantees that the United States cannot prosecute a person reasonably 
accused of genocide.61 Therefore, neither core crime can be prosecuted as 
 
 
accepted in contemporary accounts of the complimentarity principle, has consistently been endorsed 
by the ICC”). 
 60. International interest in possible prosecution with regard to detention and interrogation 
practices is evidenced by the recent request of a U.N. special rapporteur for the Obama administration 
to turn over the results of a U.S. Senate investigation into alleged torture of detainees. Colum Lynch, 
U.N. rights advocate seeks release of findings on CIA detention, WASH. POST (Mar. 04, 2013), 
available at http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-03-04/world/37439427_1_rights-advocate-human-
rights-council-rights-and-fundamental-freedoms.  
 61. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, The Need for New U.S. Legislation for Prosecution of Genocide 
and Other Crimes Against Humanity, 33 VT. L. REV. 717, 719, 723–27 (2009) (also offering draft 
legislation regarding customary crimes against humanity beyond those covered in the Rome Statute); 
Newton, supra note 53, at 146–48 (quoted supra note 54); Paust, supra note 43, at 163; Scheffer, 
supra note 6, at 87–88 (identifying the need to amend U.S. criminal legislation in order “to track 
thoroughly all of the specific crimes in Articles 5–8 of the ICC Treaty” and noting that if this does not 
occur a claim “could be raised that a gap in U.S. law renders the United States ‘unable’ to investigate 
and prosecute the specific crime”) (citing Douglass Cassel, Empowering United States Courts to Hear 
Crimes Within the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 421, 428–35 
(2001)); see also Edoardo Greppi, Inability to Investigate and Prosecute Under Article 17, in THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND NATIONAL JURISDICTIONS 63, 66 (“inability” applies when 
there is an “existence of legislative impediments, such as an amnesty law, or a statute of limitations, 
making it impossible for the national judge to start proceedings”), 67 (when domestic “‘criminal laws 
do not adequately proscribe war crimes and crimes against humanity’”), 69 (“[i]t appears reasonable 
that complimentarity . . . [applies] only for States complying with their international obligations, that 
is, having adopted an implementation legislation which enables them to investigate and prosecute the 
perpetrators of international crimes”) (MAURO POLITI & FEDERICA GIOIA eds., 2008); deGuzman, 
supra note 24, at 1407 (“[f]or genocide and crimes against humanity, the contextual aspects of the 
definitions seek to distinguish these crimes from ‘ordinary’ crimes as least in part through elements 
suggesting gravity”); Mark S. Ellis, The International Criminal Court and Its Implication for Domestic 
Law and National Capacity Building, 15 FLA. J. INT’L L. 215, 224–25 (2002–2003) (states “must . . . 
ensure that all ICC crimes are incorporated into national legislation” and “the crime of murder found 
in national law is not the same as a crime against humanity”); Matt Halling, Push the Envelope—
Watch It Bend: Removing the Policy Requirement and Extending Crimes Against Humanity, 23 
LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 827, 839 (2010) (“Complimentarity requires that states prosecute crimes as they are 
spelled out in the Rome Statute; the prosecutions have to be for ‘crimes against humanity,’ not the 
murders, rapes, and so on” in domestic law); see also supra note 54. Because the genocide legislation 
is inadequate, the United States also remains in material breach of the Genocide Convention. See 
Paust, supra, at 722, 724, 728. 
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such by the United States unless adequate legislation is created or it is 
recognized, contrary to the general assumption, that legislation is not 
actually needed in the U.S. for prosecution of customary international 
crimes, as had been the case in the past.62 In any event, for several 
decades, adequate legislation has not been created and there has been no 
attempt to prosecute U.S. or foreign persons for genocide or crimes against 
humanity as such, even though several lawsuits have been successfully 
brought in federal district courts for civil sanctions against several 
perpetrators of such crimes.63 Most notably, lawsuits in the U.S. with 
respect to genocide, war crimes, and other criminal conduct were 
successful against Radovan Karadzic,64 who is presently being prosecuted 
before the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia and was 
not prosecuted by the United States. For these reasons, it is likely that the 
United States remains unable to prosecute genocide or other crimes 
against humanity that are otherwise properly prosecutable before the ICC, 
whether or not the United States will also remain unwilling. Therefore, 
Article 17 presently poses no barrier to ICC prosecution of U.S. nationals 
for genocide or other crimes against humanity.65 
With respect to war crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC, the 
United States has two sets of legislation that would allow prosecution of 
persons accused of war crimes.66 However, there have been no 
prosecutions of any person for war crimes in U.S. federal district courts 
for at least the last several decades,67 despite the fact that there have been 
 
 
 62. See, e.g., PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra note 8, at 219–30, 237–41. 
 63. See, e.g., JORDAN J. PAUST, JON M. VAN DYKE & LINDA A. MALONE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND LITIGATION IN THE U.S. 21–25, 449–51, 461, 479, 497–98 (3d ed. 2009). 
 64. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 241–43 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1005 
(1996). 
 65. Paust, supra note 61, at 722–23. 
 66. See, e.g., PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra note 8, at 241–49; PAUST, VAN DYKE & 
MALONE, supra note 63, at 157–63. One set of statutes (10 U.S.C. § 818 (which incorporates all of the 
laws of war by reference as offenses against the laws of the United States) coupled with federal district 
court jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231) allows prosecution of any violation of the laws of war in 
U.S. federal district courts. Jordan J. Paust, After My Lai: The Case for War Crime Jurisdiction Over 
Civilians in Federal District Courts, 50 TEX. L. REV. 6, 8–12, 23, 26–27 (1971). Another statute (the 
War Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2441) allows prosecution of only a limited set of war crimes. 
 67. See also PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra note 8, at 152–53, 247; Paust, supra note 43, at 85; 
Jordan J. Paust, US Inaction: Aiding and Abetting Nazis After the Fact, JURIST (Nov. 19, 2010), http:// 
jurist.org/forum/2010/11/us-inaction-aiding-and-abetting-nazis-after-the-fact.php (noting a disclosure in a 
redacted 2006 Department of Justice report that the U.S. has been a safe haven state for certain alleged 
Nazi accused); Tung Yin, Eric Holder: Prosecutorial Discretion and Extrajudicial Deaths, JURIST 
(Sept. 26, 2012), http://jurist.org/forum/2012/09/tung-yin-holder-discretion.php (questioning the lack 
of prosecution of alleged CIA persons with respect to the deaths of two detainees in 2002 and 2003). 
 The U.S. has prosecuted some persons in military courts-martial for conduct that could have been 
charged as war crimes, but mostly merely for violations of domestic military law as such. See, e.g., 
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several successful civil cases brought in U.S. courts against violators of 
the laws of war.68 The United States seems, therefore, to be generally 
unwilling to prosecute any person of any nationality in its federal district 
courts for war crimes, and Article 17 of the Rome Statute will predictably 
continue to pose no barrier to ICC prosecution of U.S. nationals for war 
crimes. 
Of course, a viable and policy-serving complimentarity is within the 
control of the United States and could operate if the U.S. creates adequate 
legislation for prosecution of genocide and crimes against humanity and is 
genuinely willing to prosecute U.S. nationals for genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes. New legislation and a new willingness to end 
impunity and abide by the rule of law would clearly be transformative. In 
any event, the failure to do so has clearly not protected U.S. nationals from 
possible jurisdiction before the International Criminal Court. 
CONCLUSION 
Whatever the degree of validity of prior excuses for not ratifying the 
Rome Statute of the ICC, with the articulation of core crimes prosecutable 
before the ICC in Articles 6–8 of the Rome Statute and creation of the 
Elements of Crimes, the ten-year record of ICC practice, the creation of 
 
 
PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra note 8, at 291–305. However, where persons have not been tried for 
conduct that would constitute a war crime and the U.S. has merely investigated or is investigating or 
prosecuting violations of domestic military law, this does not comply with ICC complimentarity set 
forth in Article 17(1)(a)–(b) of the Rome Statute because “the case” charged cannot be “the case” 
before the ICC unless it is for the same “war crime” as such. See supra note 54; see also Burke-White, 
supra note 50, at 78 (the case against a particular accused must involve at least “the same underlying 
factual events” and complimentary is inoperative if proceedings have been merely against “certain 
groups of suspects (such as lower level perpetrators)”); Carter, supra note 54, at 181 (“presumably the 
ICC would not be barred by Article 20 because the prosecution for such a minor crime of assault” 
could be shielding the person where murder is demonstrated); Fairlie, supra note 7, at 568–69 n.240 
(noting that in view of ICC practice the domestic charges must be for “precisely the same conduct that 
is the focus of the ICC charges.”); see also supra note 61. Moreover, use of the U.S. military justice 
system is “susceptible to many . . . criticisms” more generally, because the process is “focused largely 
on concerns of efficiency and necessity. Military LOAC [law of armed conflict] investigations are 
likely best understood primarily as tools to ensure good order and discipline as means to the end of 
military mission accomplishment rather than as means to justice, humane warfare, or even 
international legal compliance.” Sean Watts, Domestic Investigation of Suspected Law of Armed 
Conflict Violations: United States Procedures, Policies, and Practices, in 14 Y.B. INT’L 
HUMANITARIAN L. 85, 104 (2012). Concerning difficulties involved in connection with military 
prosecutions and consequential failures to prosecute certain persons, see, e.g., Major Franklin D. 
Rosenblatt, Non-Deployable: The Court-Martial System in Combat from 2001 to 2009, ARMY LAW, 
Sept. 2010, at 12; Major John M. Hackel, Planning for the Strategic Case: A Proposal to Allow the 
Handling of Marine Corps War Crimes Prosecutions with Counterinsurgency Doctrine, 57 NAVAL L. 
REV. 239, 241–44, 248–58, 268–79 (2009). 
 68. See, e.g., PAUST, VAN DYKE & MALONE, supra note 63, at 25–26, 475–76. 
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the Kampala definition of aggression that requires a manifest violation of 
the U.N. Charter, and creation of an opt out provision with respect to the 
crime of aggression that the U.S. can take advantage of, the prior excuses 
have become unfounded. The fact that there are now 121 parties to the 
treaty and that Article 12(2)(a) of the treaty assures that there is no 
immunity of U.S. nationals from ICC jurisdiction over crimes covered in 
Articles 6–8 that occur at least partly in the territory of one or more of 121 
countries underscores the fact that a desire to protect U.S. nationals from 
ICC prosecution is not a viable reason for not becoming a party to the 
treaty. In reality, there are no longer any meaningful excuses. 
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